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Rufus A. Johnstone andRedouanBshary
Department of Zoology, University of Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge CB2 3EJ, UKHow can cooperation persist in the face of a temptation to ‘cheat’? Several recent papers have suggested that
the answer may lie in indirect reciprocity. Altruistic individuals may benefit by eliciting altruism from observ-
ers, rather than (as in direct reciprocity) from the recipient of the aid they provide. Here, we point out that
indirect reciprocity need not always favour cooperation; by contrast, it may support spiteful behaviour,
which is costly for the both actor and recipient. Existing theory suggests spite is unlikely to persist, but we
demonstrate that it may do so when spiteful individuals are less likely to incur aggression from observers
(a negative form of indirect reciprocity).
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Humans often help others in situations where direct
reciprocation by the beneficiary of their altruistic act is
highly unlikely (Alexander 1987). Recently, game theoreti-
cal models have demonstrated that such altruism can
nevertheless prove evolutionarily stable, provided one
allows for ‘image scoring’ by observers (Nowak & Sigmund
1998a,b; Lotem et al. 1999, 2003; Leimar & Hammerstein
2001). In these models, altruistic individuals improve their
‘reputation’ or ‘image’ (while selfish individuals impair
theirs), increasing (or, in the case of selfishness, decreas-
ing) their own probability of receiving help from others
when needed. Most recently, Lotem et al. (2003) have
linked indirect reciprocity with Zahavi’s (1975) handicap
principle: altruism may lead to an improved ‘image’
because it serves as a costly (and therefore honest) signal of
quality, which may prove attractive to potential mates as
well as encouraging altruistic responses from others. An
experiment with students provides evidence supporting
these ideas, showing that in humans, altruistic individuals
may receive a higher pay-off than selfish individuals as a
result of indirect reciprocity (Wedekind &Milinski 2000).
A basic requirement for image scoring is that interactions
take place within a ‘communication network’, in which
bystanders may readily ‘eavesdrop’ on encounters between
others (McGregor 1993; McGregor et al. 2000). There is
now growing evidence that eavesdropping does occur in a
wide range of taxa, from primates to crabs (Cheney & Sey-
farth 1990; Naguib & Todt 1997; Oliveira et al. 1998;
Naguib et al. 1999; Peake et al. 2001; Earley & Dugatkin
2002), and some indications that animals may conse-
quently adjust their behaviour in response to the presence
of bystanders (Doutrelant et al. 2001; Bshary 2002).
Intriguingly, however, most of these empirical studies have
focused, not on altruistic or cooperative interactions, but
on competitive or agonistic encounters. In this context,
‘image scoring’ is likely to promote greater levels of
aggression rather than cooperation, because it means that a
victorious individual will not only obtain the contested
resource, but will also improve its reputation, reducing itschance of incurring aggression from others (Johnstone
2001).
Here, we further explore the consequences of eavesdrop-
ping in antagonistic contexts, focusing on the possibility of
spite. We demonstrate that just as image scoring can sup-
port costly altruistic acts that would otherwise prove
unstable, so too can it support costly spiteful acts that
otherwise would not persist. Just as altruism may be
favoured because it encourages observers to act altruisti-
cally towards the focal individual, so spite may be favoured
because it discourages observers from acting aggressively
towards the perpetrator (a form of ‘negative indirect recip-
rocity’).2. AMODELOFNEGATIVE INDIRECTRECIPROCITY
Consider a population in which individuals engage in ran-
dom, pairwise encounters over a large number of ‘rounds’.
In each round, one member of every pair, chosen at ran-
dom and referred to (for that round) as an active player,
must decide whether or not to attack the other (who is
referred to, for that round, as a passive player).
Individuals vary in their strength or competitive ability S,
which is distributed according to the probability density
function f ðSÞ ¼ F 0ðSÞ; for simplicity, we will describe them
in terms of their relative competitive ability s ¼ FðSÞ, so
that an individual for whom s ¼ 0:25 is stronger than 25%
of the population, one for whom s ¼ 0:5 is stronger that
50% of the population, and so on. Assuming that no two
individuals have precisely the same competitive ability, s is
thus evenly distributed between zero and unity (regardless
of the form of f(S)).
An individual that chooses to attack inflicts an additive
fitness cost c ð> 0) on the target. If the victim is stronger
than the attacker, however, then the latter also incurs an
additive fitness cost of d ð> 0); if the victim is weaker than
the attacker, then the latter obtains an additive fitness
benefit of b (a negative value of b implies that even victory
entails a net cost for the attacker). For simplicity, we will
scale these various costs and benefits so that c ¼ 1 (d and b
may therefore be interpreted as the cost or benefit of attack-
ing stronger and weaker opponents, relative to the cost of
being attacked).
2Individuals may base their decision about whether or not
to attack on their opponent’s most recent action as an
active player (i.e. on whether or not their opponent itself
chose to attack on the last occasion when it had the opport-
unity to do so). Because the expected cost that the active
player incurs if it attacks is a non-increasing function of its
relative competitive ability, we assume that it will choose to
attack only if this ability exceeds some threshold value.
Given the option of taking into account an opponent’s
most recent action, a strategy can thus be defined by two
threshold values, t1 and t2 (< t1), the critical competitive
abilities above which a player will attack an opponent that
chose (at its last opportunity) to attack or not to attack,
respectively. We wish to determine the evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS) or strategies (t1
, t2
), which maximizes an
individual’s long-term average pay-off per round (our mea-
sure of fitness), given that it is adopted by other members of
the population.(a) Solving themodel
Consider a population of individuals that adopt the strat-
egy (t1, t2). The proportion of players in this population
that, at the end of round n, chose to attack when they last
had the opportunity to do so, is denoted a(n). This pro-
portion changes from one round to the next according to
the following difference equation
aðnþ 1Þ ¼ 1
2
aðnÞ þ 1
2
½aðnÞð1 t1Þ þ ð1 aðnÞÞð1 t2Þ;
converging to a, given by
a ¼ að1 t1Þ þ ð1 aÞð1 t2Þ;
a ¼ 1 t2 :
1þ t1  t2
In this population, the relative competitive ability of anindividual who chose not to attack when it last had the
opportunity to do so must fall between 0 and t1 (because
those of greater strength always choose to attack). The
probability that the relative competitive ability of such an
individual falls below t2, converges to p0 given by
p0 ¼ t2
1 a ¼
t2
t1
ð1þ t1  t2Þ;
while the probability that the competitive ability of such an
individual falls above t2 converges to p1 given by
p1 ¼ 1 p0 ¼ ð1 t2Þ
t1
ðt1  t2Þ:
We can use the above results to determine the long-term
average pay-off per round (our measure of fitness) to a
mutant individual of relative competitive ability, s, that
never attacks, denoted Wn(s). Equally, we can also work
out the pay-off to such a mutant that attacks only if its
opponent failed to attack at its last opportunity,Wc(s), and
to a mutant that always attacks,Wa(s):
W nðsÞ ¼ 0 1
2
ð1 t2Þ;W cðsÞ ¼
1
2
ð1 aÞ p0s
t2
b 1 p0s
t2
 
d
 
 1
2
ðað1 t2Þ þ ð1 aÞð1 t1ÞÞ; for s< t2,
1
2
ð1 aÞ 1 p1ðt1  sÞ
t1  t2
 
b p1ðt1  sÞ
t1  t2 d
 
 1
2
ðað1 t2Þ þ ð1 aÞð1 t1ÞÞ; for t2< s< t1,
1
2
ð1 aÞb 1
2
ðað1 t2Þ þ ð1 aÞð1 t1ÞÞ; for t1< s,
8>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>:
W aðsÞ¼ 1 ðsbð1 sÞdÞ 1 ð1 t1Þ:
2 2
In each of the above equations, the first term on the right
hand side represents the expected cost or benefit as a result
of aggression by the focal player (the probability that the
focal player is active, multiplied by the probability that it
then chooses to attack, multiplied by the expected pay-off
from attacking). The second term represents the expected
cost as a result of aggression by others directed against the
focal player (the probability that the focal player is passive,
multiplied by the probability that its opponent then choo-
ses to attack, multiplied by the cost of being attacked).
Based on the formulae given above, the expected pay-off
(averaging over all possible relative competitive abilities) to
a mutant that adopts the strategy ðt01, t02Þ, denoted W ðt01, t02Þ,
is given by
W ðt01; t02Þ ¼
Z0
t0
2
W nðsÞdsþ
Zt02
t0
1
W cðsÞdsþ
Z1
t0
1
W aðsÞds: ð2:1Þ
A necessary condition for the evolutionary stability of a
strategy ðt1, t2Þ is that
W ðt01, t02Þ6 W ðt1, t2Þ for all ðt01, t02Þðt1, t2Þ ;
assuming that typical members of the population adopt the
strategy ðt1; t2Þ. This condition implies locally that (for
0 < t2< t

1<1)
@ W ðt01, t02Þ
@t01
¼ @
W ðt01, t02Þ
@t02
¼ 0 for t01 ¼ t1, t02 ¼ t2, ð2:2Þ
which, together with equation (2.1), can be used to identify
potential equilibria (see Appendix A for details).
We can also examine the convergence stability of candi-
date equilibria under the adaptive dynamics described by
Hofbauer & Sigmund (1998). Thus, we assume that evol-
utionary change in the strategy (t1, t2) adopted by a popu-
lation depends on the slope of mutant fitness with respect
to each component of the strategy, i.e.
_t1 ¼ @
W ðt01, t02Þ
@t01
, _t2 ¼ @
W ðt01, t02Þ
@t02
,
where both derivatives are evaluated at ðt01, t02Þ = (t1, t2).
Ultimately, we are interested in equilibria that are both evolu-
tionarily stable (i.e. immune to invasion) and convergence
stable (implying that populations adopting a strategy that
deviates slightly from the ESS will tend towards it under the
influence of selection).
Having identified an equilibrium that features a non-
zero frequency of aggression, we can ask whether (or how
often) this aggression proves spiteful (i.e. entails an
immediate cost). Clearly, if b < 0, aggression must always
be spiteful, because even victory then entails a net cost for
an attacker. If b > 0, however, the sign of the immediate
3mean pay-off to attack depends upon the attacker’s com-
petitive ability (and upon the last action of the victim,
because this conveys information about the latter’s com-
petitive ability). An individual of relative compeitive ability
s, who attacks an opponent who refrained from attacking at
the last opportunity it had to do so, obtains an immediate
mean pay-off ofA0(s), given by
A0ðsÞ¼
b p0
s
t2
 
d 1p0 s
t2
 
for s6 t2,
b p0þp1 s t2
t1 t2
  
d 1p0p1 s t2
t1 t2
  
for t2< s6 t1
b for t1< s,
,
8>>><
>>>:
while the immediate mean pay-off from attacking an
opponent who also chose to attack at the last opportunity it
had to do so, denotedA1(s), is given by
A1ðsÞ¼
d for s6 t2,
bq0
s t2
t1 t2
 
d 1 q0 s t2
t1 t2
  
for t2< s6 t1,
bq1
s t1
1 t1
 
d 1 q1 s t1
1 t1
  
for t1< s,
8>><
>>:
where q0 denotes the probability that the competitive abil-
ity of an opponent who chose to attack at the last opport-
unity falls between t2 and t1, and q1 the probability that it
falls aove t1. These values are given by
q1¼ 1 t1
a
¼ 1 t1
1 t2 ð1þ t1 t2Þ; q0¼ 1 q1:
We can use the above expressions to determine the critical
levels of competitive ability, s0 and s1, below which any
decision to attack a non-aggressive or an aggressive
opponent entails an immediate mean cost. These values
then allow us to determine what fraction of attacks are
spiteful in nature. For instance (assuming b>0), if
t2< s0< t1< s1, as turns out to be the case at any equilib-
rium featuring aggression (see below), the proportion of
attacks that are spiteful is given by
aðs1 t1Þþð1aÞðs0 t2Þ
að1 t1Þþð1aÞð1 t2Þ ¼ ðs1 t1Þþ
ð1aÞ
a
ðs0 t2Þ:3. RESULTS
As detailed in Appendix A, when b > 0 (so that victory
yields an immediate positive pay-off), the model yields a
single strategy that is both evolutionarily and convergently
stable. This strategy features values of t1 and t

2 that
are both less than unity (precise formulae are given in
Appendix A), so that it leads to a positive frequency of
attack, as illustrated in figure 1. At this equlibrium, a non-
zero fraction of aggressive acts are spiteful, in the sense that
their immediate mean pay-off is negative. The agressors
involved nevertheless choose to attack because this
immediate cost is outweighed by the benefits of an aggress-
ive image: a player that is seen to attack others is less likely
to be attacked itself, providing a reputation benefit that
helps to maintain aggression at higher levels than would
otherwise occur. In other words, spitefully attacking others
can prove stable simply because it reduces the chances of
being attacked oneself.The frequency of spite at equilibrium (i.e. the proportion
of agonistic encounters in which the aggressor chooses to
attack even though doing so yields an immediate mean pay-
off less than zero) varies in relation to the parameters b and
d, as illustrated in figure 2. If the benefits of victory are low,
the majority of aggression may qualify as spite. Neverthe-
less, there is always a non-zero frequency of straightforward
aggression, in which the immediate mean pay-off to attack
is positive. We therefore refer to this outcome as one of
‘occasional spite’.
When 0 > b > 1=ð4dÞ (so that attacking always entails
an immediate cost, even if the attacker wins), the model
yields two convergently stable ESSs: the one discussed
above (and detailed in Appendix A), and the alternative
strategy (1, 1) which specifies a complete absence of
aggression; between these two lies an ESS that is not con-
vergently stable. Which of the two stable endpoints a popu-
lation attains depends on the initial conditions, as
illustrated in figure 3. In a population that settles at the
aggressive equilibrium, it is clear that all aggression must be0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
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Figure 1. (a) The frequency of attack at the equilibrium
described in themain text as a function of d, the cost of
attacking a stronger victim (relative to the cost of being
attacked), and b, the benefit of attacking a weaker victim
(relative to the cost of being attacked). (b) The proportion of
individuals at the aggressive equilibriumwho never attack
(white area), who attack conditionally (if their opponent was
not seen to attack itself when it last had the opportunity to do
so) (grey area), and who always attack (black area), as a
function of b (assuming that d ¼ 1).
4spiteful, because a negative value of b implies that attack
always entails an immediate cost. We therefore refer to this
as outcome as ‘universal spite’.
Finally, when 1
ð4dÞ > b (so that even victory entails a
substantial fitness cost), the non-aggressive strategy (1, 1)
is the only ESS (and is convergently stable).
The reason why eavesdropping is stable in our model,
i.e. the reason why (at an aggressive equilibrium) it pays to
adjust one’s threshold for attack according to the oppo-
nent’s previous actions, is that aggression is a reliable signal
of strength. It does not pay weaker individuals to act
aggressively because they are more likely to incur substan-
tial costs as a result; hence, those opponents that are seen to
attack are likely to be of greater competitive ability, and are
less likely to become the target of aggression.4. DISCUSSION
The most influential adaptive accounts of spiteful behav-
iour, developed by Hamilton (1970) and Wilson (1975),
are based on inclusive fitness arguments. Despite a few
possible examples (Foster et al. 2001), however, these ideas
are widely thought to be of limited applicability (Hamilton
1970; Foster et al. 2001). Here, by contrast, we have shown
that spite can evolve readily in agonistic contexts.
Suppose that there are immediate benefits (however
small) to be gained by attacking and defeating a rival (in
terms of the model, b > 0). Selection will then favour some
frequency of non-spiteful aggression. Where this
aggression carries potential costs, weaker individuals are
less likely to attack than are stronger competitors. As a
result, it pays observers to ‘eavesdrop’ on encounters
between others, and subsequently to exercise greater cau-tion in attacking more aggressive opponents. In turn, this
favours greater levels of aggression, as a means of deterring
subsequent attack (see Johnstone 2001). The net result, as
our model reveals, is ‘occasional spite’: an equilibrium at
which levels of aggression are elevated (perhaps substan-
tially) beyond the point where attack yields a positive mean
pay-off. Individuals at this equilibrium will sometimes
attack opponents likely to defeat and inflict costs on them,
simply in order to gain reputation benefits. Indeed, if the
immediate benefits of victory are small, the model demon-
strates that such spiteful acts may constitute the majority of
aggressive encounters. The costly nature of this spiteful
behaviour in the short term is outweighed by long-term
advantages because of negative indirect reciprocity.
Even when victory entails a net fitness cost for an
attacker (b< 0), aggression can nevertheless persist. The
model shows that ‘universal spite’ can be stable under these
circumstances, yielding an equilibrium at which indivi-
duals engage in spiteful aggression simply in order to deter
future spite directed at themselves. We suggest, however,
that this outcome is unlikely: the same circumstances that
yield a universally spiteful equilibrium also permit a non-
aggressive one, at which all individuals do better. Because0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
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Figure 2. Contour plot of the frequency of spite (i.e. the
proportion of agonistic acts in which the aggressor attacks
despite the fact that doing so yields an immediate mean pay-
off that is negative) at the equilibrium described in themain
text, as a function of d, the cost of attacking a stronger victim
(relative to the cost of being attacked), and b, the benefit of
attacking a weaker victim (relative to the cost of being
attacked).t1
t2
Figure 3. Evolutionary trajectories, in the permissible triangle
of (t1, t2)-values for which t26 t1, under the adaptive dynamics.
Results are for the illustrative case in which b ¼ 1=8
(implying that even victory entails an immediate fitness cost
for an attacker) and d ¼ 1. Under these circumstances, as
discussed in the text, the model yields two convergently stable
ESSs: the aggressive ESS defined in Appendix A (marked on
the figure as a filled circle), which under these circumstances
represents a purely spiteful outcome, and the alternative ESS
(1, 1) (marked as a filled square), which leads to a complete
absence of aggression. The open circle marks the convergently
unstable ESS that lies between the two stable endpoints. The
pale arrows desribe the vector field of the adaptive dynamics,
while the solid curves represent sample trajectories. Clearly,
the stable endpoint for an evolving population depends on the
starting conditions.
5mean fitness is lower at the spiteful equilibrium, it seems
unlikely that populations which have become trapped at
this ‘paradoxical’ ESS will persist (and, in addition, it is not
clear what selective pressures could drive the transition
from a non-aggressive to a universally spiteful equilibrium).
It seems more likely that spite will arise in conjunction
with straghtforward aggression, under the circumstances
described above.
By some definitions (e.g. Pierotti 1980), the behaviour
we focus on (attacking an opponent even when doing so
yields an immediate mean pay-off that is negative) might
not be described as truly spiteful: if the immediate costs of
attack are outweighed by the long-term benefits of estab-
lishing an aggressive image or reputation, then aggression
could be said to prove self-serving rather than spiteful. By
the same logic, however, altruism based on positive recip-
rocity (direct or indirect) should not qualify as true altru-
ism: if the immediate costs of altruistic actions are
outweighed by the benefits of establishing a positive image,
then once again such behaviour is simply self-serving. The
point we wish to emphasise (as do models of positive
indirect reciprocity) is that immediate costly actions can be
favoured through their long-term impact on the image or
reputation of the actor. We have focused here on repu-
tation benefits in the form of a reduced risk of attack, but
just as Lotem et al. (2003) argue that altruism may prove
attractive to potential mates as well as encouraging altruism
from others, we too could argue that spite may bring mat-
ing benefits as well as discouraging aggression, because it
serves as a signal of strength.
Finally, if spite (in the sense explained above) may so
readily evolve in the context of agonistic encounters, why
have more instances not been reported? Although it is
accepted that humans frequently inflict costs on others at
their own expense (Wilson 1975; and see Fehr & Ga¨chter
(2002) for an experimental demonstration), reports of
spiteful behaviour in other animals are rare and conten-
tious (Pierotti 1980; FitzGerald 1992; Gadagkar 1993;
though see Foster et al. 2001). We suggest, however, that
spiteful aggression has often been overlooked. Seeking an
adaptive explanation of aggressive behaviour, ethologists
and behavioural ecologists have naturally focused on those
occasions when attack yields immediate benefits (a con-
tested resource item, territory or mate). Even if victory is
rare, attackers often lose, and sometimes incur substantial
injuries as a result, it is generally assumed (without quan-
titative calculation) that the expected benefits of victory
must always outweigh these costs: otherwise why would
agressive behaviour have evolved? However, in many
instances we suggest the immediate expected pay-off to
attack may be negative. Instead, aggression may be
favoured in part by indirect reciprocity, proving spiteful
in the short term. Without a proper calculation of the
balance between expected costs and benefits of attack
(something that is rarely attempted), one cannot dismiss
the possibility that aggression is actually spiteful. We thus
predict that future studies may well yield evidence for
frequent occurrences of spite and indirect negative
reciprocity in nature.
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When b >1/(4d), equations (2.1) and (2.2) yield the solution
t1 ¼
ð1 AÞð1þ b2  bð1 dÞÞ þ 2dð1þ ð1þ bÞd þ d2Þ
2ð1þ d þ d2 þ d3  bð1 2d  d2Þ þ b2ð1 dÞ  b3Þ ;
 1þ d þ d2 þ d3 þ dð3bþ 2bd þ d2Þ  Að1þ ð1þ bÞd þ d2Þt2 ¼ 2ð1þ d þ d2 þ d3  bð1 2d  d2Þ þ b2ð1 dÞ  b3Þ ;
where
A ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ1þ 4bdp :
This strategy is both evolutionarily stable and, as may be
shown by numerical evaluation of the eigenvalues of the
Jacobian matrix for the adaptive dynamics at (t1; t

2), is also
convergence stable. When adopted by a population, the
strategy leads to a positive frequency of aggression equal to
ð1þ AÞð1þ ð1þ bÞd þ d2Þ  2bþ 2b2ð1 dÞ  2b3
ð1þ d  bÞð2þ ð1þ AÞd þ 2d2 þ bðAþ 4d  1Þ þ 2b2Þ :
For b < 0, the strategy (1, 1), which implies that indivi-
duals should never attack, is also evolutionarily and con-
vergently stable. For 0 > b > 1=ð4d ), the model thus
yields two alternative, stable endpoints; in this case, a third
ESS that is not convergently stable lies between the two
stable equilibria, as illustrated in figure 3.REFERENCES
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